Orders and Indices of Criticality in Simple Games

Título: Orders and Indices of Criticality in Simple Games

Ponente: Vito Fragnelli (Universidad del Piamonte Oriental)

Organizador: Joaquín Sánchez Soriano

Fecha: Viernes 10 de mayo de 2019, 12:45 h.

Lugar: Sala de Seminarios, Instituto Universitario de Investigación CIO, Edificio Torretamarit, Universidad Miguel Hernández (Campus de Elche)

Resumen: The talk investigates the blackmailing power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. The classical notion of criticality of players is extended in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to the collusion with other players.

Next, the notion of power index for simple games is generalized to different orders of criticality.

Finally, the behavior of these criticality indices is analyzed for comparing the power of different players within a single voting situation, and across different voting situations.